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Disputation of Relevant Facts as set out by Appellee
Mrs. Case, the Appellee, sets out her "Statement of Relevant Facts", Brief of
Appellee, pp. 15 - 21. Mr. Case, Appellant, disputes those "facts" as follows:
1.

At 5 5 of her brief, Mrs. Case states that the Judgment of Dissolution

gave her nothing by way of child support. While she does reference the record and
the judgment itself, Mr. Case asserts that the judgment speaks for itself and did
give her a right to child support; specifically a reservation of child support until the
first of a number of conditions precedent.
2.

At 5 7 of her brief, Mrs. Case asserts as fact that the parties' marital

settlement agreement was incorporated into the Judgment of Dissolution and that
the provision addressing change of circumstances was made part thereof. The
record at 7 - 13, and 82 - 111, shows that the stipulation itself is not a part of the
Judgment of Dissolution. The provision concerning changed circumstances is not
part of that judgment. That marital settlement agreement was not part of the record
upon which the summary judgment was granted; it was not raised by Mrs. Case
until after that summary judgment was granted and she raised it only in her response to Mr. Case's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. See record at 82 - 111.
3.

Mrs. Case asserts, at J 8, she was forced to accept government assis-

tance and could not continue to support the children on her own. Those allegations
are not in the record and had not been raised below. Upon information and belief,
Mr. Case asserts that she was remarried throughout all time periods relevant hereto.
4.

Presumably Mrs. Case simply erred when she asserts the petition was

filed March, 2002, in fact it was March, 2003.
5.

While it is true Mr. Case was served, record at 16, Mrs. Case asser-

tions of fact at 5 10 of her brief are not in the record and should not be considered
here.
4

6.

Mrs. Case argues general versus special and personal jurisdiction in 5

11 and it is asserted that the answer speaks for itself, that there has been no determination of special versus general appearance nor has personal jurisdiction been
argued herein, and Mr. Case denies such allegations — his answer speaks for itself.
7.

Mrs. Case argues the case in 55 15, 16, and 17 of her facts and Mr.

Case asserts that he has not argued anything erroneously and there has been no
such determinations nor findings and that the pleadings referred to therein speak
for themselves.
8.

Mrs. Case argues again in her facts at 5 18, yet the record shows Mr.

Case's first Notice to Submit was filed with the trial court on October 20, 2003,
and indicated that no responsive pleading had been received. In fact, Mrs. Case's
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment
was mailed the day before that first notice to submit, record at 94; obviously those
pleadings crossed in the mail..
9.

In 55 19 - 23 Mrs. Case appears to argue her case under the guise of

facts. Mr. Case asserts that the documents referred to in those paragraphs speak for
themselves.
10.

Specifically addressing claims raised by Mrs. Case in 5 23, Mr. Case

asserts the first notice to submit clearly shows there was no responsive pleading
from Mrs. Case (that notice was timely filed on October 20, 2003, despite Mrs.
Case's assertions of its mail date). The court having received Mrs. Case's responsive pleading knew that it had not reached Mr. Case's counsel, for it was not listed
on the notice to submit, and the court should not have made any decision without
opportunity for Mr. Case to respond under rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Mr. Case had five days from service of that responsive pleading to
file his rebuttal without regard to a prior notice to submit.
5

ARGUMENT;
Point One; Does a Utah District Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to
modify the provisions of a California Judgment of Dissolution addressing
child support when the Petitioner is a resident of Utah and the Respondent is
not a resident of Utah and is no longer a resident of California?
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
In her brief, Mrs. Case adds to this issue the additional statement "but is

subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah."

Personal jurisdiction is not the issue

raised here. Subject matter jurisdiction exists independent from personal jurisdiction.
Throughout her brief, Mrs. Case appears to confuse and intertwine personal
jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction; she seems to argue that the gain of
personal jurisdiction automatically bestows subject matter jurisdiction. "The conception of jurisdiction of courts is generally split up into two branches Jurisdiction
over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the parties. To properly act in a case,
a court must be vested with both jurisdictions." 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §105
(citations omitted).
"Jurisdiction of the 'subject matter' is the power of a court to hear and
determine cases of a general class to which the action in question belongs. A court's jurisdiction of the subject matter in a divorce case exists when a constitution or statute confers upon that court the power to
adjudge a divorce. It is more than a power to act upon a particular
state of facts; it is the power to act upon the abstract question and to
determine whether the particular facts call for the exercise of the abstract power."
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 232 (citations omitted). 'The courts have
no common-law jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce does

6

not exist unless it has been conferred by constitution or statute." Id.
On the other hand, "[tjhat a court has 'jurisdiction of a party' means either
that the party has appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, that he has
otherwise waived service of process, or that process has properly issued and been
served upon him." 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §105 (citations omitted).
Based upon these precepts, the Utah trial court needs to have both subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. It is the lack of subject
matter jurisdiction that Mr. Case raises in this appeal; he is not arguing that the trial
court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Mrs. Case is correct when she states that in Utah the district court has
"original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by
statute." Utah Const. Art VIII. Judicial Department, § 5. In Utah, the district
courts have been granted the power to hear and grant divorces as well as orders
modifying decrees of divorce by statute, specifically §30-3-5, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended).
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, UIFSA, does limit that jurisdiction. Under UIFSA there is the policy of one order, one time, one place and consistent therewith only one court is authorized to establish or modify a child support
order at a time. UIFSA § 205 provides
"A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with
the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child
support order
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is
issued; or
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to
modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction."

7

Section 78-45f-205, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
However, when, as in the instant case, a foreign decree is sought to be modified in Utah §§78-45f-611 and 78-45f-613, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended),
control. Utah's §78-45f-611, Modification of child support order of another state,
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended) says:
"Modification of child support order of another state
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been
registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if Section 78-45f-6l3 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that:
fa) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
tribunal of this state; or
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties
who are individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal
for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or established procedures substantially similar to the procedures under this
chapter, the consent otherwise required of an individual residing in
this state is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to
modify the child support order."
§78-45f-611 Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
The exception noted above, §78-45f-613, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as
amended), addresses jurisdiction to modify a child support order of another state
when all individual parties reside in this state. As Mr. Case does not reside in
Utah this exception does not apply here. See §78-45f-613(l), Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended).
Arnold H. Rutkin, 5 Family Law and Practice, § 48 (Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc. 1997), the authority cited by Mrs. Case, sets out an entire subsection enti8

tied "Registration and Modification"; Rutkin, Family Law and Practice
§48.03(8)(d), 48-80, a copy of which is attached in the appendix for the benefit of
the court. Citing § 611 of UIFSA, Rutkin states that
"[wlhere the individual parties and the child have left the issuing state,
or if the individual parties agree in writing to take the case to another
state, UIFSA sets out a methodology for registering the support order
in another state for purposes of modification- While either tide obligor
or obligee may seek a modification of the order, modification must oe
sought in the jurisdiction of the opposing party."
Rutkin, Family Law and Practice §48.03(8)(d), 48-80 - 48-81.
Mrs. Case filed her petition to register her California Judgment of Dissolution and modify that California Judgment. Record at 4. She complied with the
registration portion of subparagraph (1) of §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. (1953,
as amended). In order to proceed, "the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if Section 78-45f-613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that: (a) the following requirements are met" (subparagraph b, is in the
alternative, and does not apply as the parties have not filed written consents in
California).
We now turn to those subparagraph "a" requirements of § 78-45f-61L Mrs.
Case has met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(l); "the child, the individual
obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state". Mrs. Case may arguably have met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(3), "the respondent is
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state". But, Mrs. Case has
not met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(2), "a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification". Nor can she; Mrs. Case, the petitioner, is not
a "nonresident of this state".
As such, the trial court erred in granting a judgment. The trial court did not
follow its statutory authority in having a hearing, after notice, to determine if it had
9

subject matter jurisdiction. Had the trial court complied with §78-45f-611 and held
the hearing, it would have seen that Mrs. Case, while being the petitioner, is not a
"non-resident". As such the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction- The trial
court cannot act.
Mrs. Case attempts to distinguish State of Utah v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 690 (Utah App, 1994), arguing terminology, specifically whether
her Judgment of Dissolution issued from a circuit court or district court. Brief of
Appellee at 25-26. While it is true that her judgment issued from the Superior
Court, Stanislaus County, California, a California superior court which may or may
not be the equivalent to our district court, her analysis seems incorrect. State of
Utah v. Child Support Enforcement, was cited by Mr. Case for the proposition that
if a Utah court lacks subject matter jurisdiction the orders of that court are improper and should be vacated. State of Utah v. Child Support Enforcement at 691 692. The terminology does not control; it does not matter what the court may be
called. The deciding factor is whether or not the Utah court has subject matter jurisdiction; if not, then its orders must be vacated.

B.

Personal Jurisdiction
The numerous cases and authorities cited by Mrs. Case in her brief all go to

personal jurisdiction and do not address subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Case is not
in this appeal arguing personal jurisdiction nor has he raised this as a point for
appeal.
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 109 L Ed 2d 631,
110 S Ct 2105 (1990), determines whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process. Id. J. Scalia notes that in the court below the petitioner challenged personal jurisdiction and that the state "court held it to be 'a valid
10

jurisdictional predicate for in personam'...'". Bumham 495 U.S. at 608,109 L Ed
2d at 638,110 S Ct at 2109. J. Scalia goes on with his analysis of the development
of personal jurisdiction including Pennoyer v. Neff, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, and all of the related progeny of those cases on the issue of personal
jurisdiction. Bumham, 495 U.S. 608 - 622,109 L Ed 2d at 638 - 647,110 S Ct at
2109 -2117. J. Scalia holds that due process is satisfied on the issue of personal jurisdiction in that case. Bumham 495 U.S. at 622,109 L Ed 2d at 647,110 S Ct at
2117. No discussion of subject matter jurisdiction, let alone even mention of the
term "subject matter jurisdiction", has been found by Appellant's counsel or his
staff in Bumham.
Also of note, most of the cases cited by Mrs. Case and discussed predate the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; that act having been enacted from 1996 or
later by the various states.

In like matter the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of

Laws § 457 cited by Mrs. Case was published decades ago (Restatement 2nd
Conflict of Laws was published in the mid-sixties). As an example of the age of
that citation, the very next section § 458 states "[[n]o state will directly enforce a
duty to support created by the law of another state" with the rationale that the duty
of support is an enforcement of its own public policy. Restatement (First) of Conflicts of Laws. That sentiment is an archaic policy which does not comport with
current legal thinking and a large portion of the UIFSA; UIFSA itself deals, in
large part, with enforcement of support order by states which are not the state
which created that support order.
In actuality dealing with the UIFSA, Mrs. Case does cite Rutkin's treatise,
specifically §48.03(a), 48-38, raising the one-state, two-state argument. Rutkin,
Family Law and Practice, states that "UIFSA also contains a one-state enforcement mechanism commonly referred to as direct withholding. For cases falling
u

beyond a state's long-arm jurisdiction, UIFSA offers the equivalent to the familiar
URESA two-state proceeding" Supra at 48-39.
In reading the section of cited by Mrs. Case, Rutkin is discussing enforcement of child support orders in this section of his tome; modification of child support orders is discussed in a separate section, see Rutkin, Family Law and Practice,
§48.03(8)(d), 48-80. As the one-state concept is "direct withholding" or enforcement of an order that concept does not apply to the instant matter which is a modification. Therefore the instant matter cannot be a one-state matter. And, as § 7827-24, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), Utah's long-arm statute does not
apply, the instant matter is one of those "all other cases" which fall into the twostate category. Id, Rutkin's a Family Law and Practice, by the section cited by
Mrs. Case, makes the instant matter a two-state type of case contrary to Mrs.
Case's assertions that it is not.
Mrs. Case takes this one-state, two-state, analysis to Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 1999 UT App 52 (Utah
App. 1999) and concludes that Jacoby was a two-state matter and asserts that the
instant case is a one-state matter and as such §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended), does not apply. Yet Jacoby does not use the terms one-state
or two-state and Rutkin, Family Law and Practice, does not make any such distinction under his modification analysis.
Mrs. Case does agree that Jacoby involved an attempted modification of a
foreign decree in Utah, see Brief of Appellee p. 30, just as in the instant case. In
Jacoby it was a Virginia decree which became a Pennsylvania decree. Jacoby at
941. In the instant case, it is a California Judgment of Dissolution. Record at 7. In
Jacoby, the husband, in response to Pennsylvania's attempt to enforce a child support order in Utah, filed a petition to modify his child support. Jacoby at 941. In
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the instant case Mrs. Case filed a Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree
and Modification of Decree with the goal of modifying child support. Record at 5.
Mrs. Case accepts that Jacoby was a two-state matter and §78-45f-611 properly
applied, Brief of Appellee at 32, yet argues without support that the instant case is
not a two-state matter and as such §75-45f-611 does not apply. Mrs. Case also
distinguishes Gentzel v. Williams, 965 P.2d 855 (Kan. App, 1998) which involved
a husband in Kansas seeking to modify an Arizona decree when the wife had
moved and relocated to Texas.
Factually, there is no difference between the instant case and Jacoby or
Gentzel. All three cases involve the modification of a decree of divorce from state
"A" on the issue of child support where the husband had moved to state "B" and
the wife and child moved to state "C". Section 611 of the UIFSA applies and the
person seeking the modification must be a "non-resident" of the state in which the
modification is sought in order to proceed. Using Rutkin's language, all three
cases are two-state cases and under Rutkin, Family LMW and Practice, UIFSA §611
applies. Mr. Case suggests that Mrs. Case's analysis of Jacoby, Gentzel, and
Rutkin, Family IMW and Practice, are in error. Section 78-45f-611 applies to the
instant case and the outcome here should be the same as in Jacoby, dismissal of
Mrs. Case's claims for modification of child support due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction is not relevant. See, Jacoby at 946.

C

Use of UCCJEA as a basis for modification of child support:
Mr. Case, in his brief, did raise the point that the only statutory authority

cited to the trial court by Mrs. Case was Utah's UCCJEA, §§ 78-45c-100 - 318,
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
Mrs. Case argues that such a citation was proper, or at least harmless error. See
13

Brief of Appellee at 32-33. In support of her argument, Mrs. Case cites McCormick v. McCormick, 623 SW2d 909 (Kentucky 1981).
McCormick involved a petition to modify a decree of divorce on this issue of
child support where the decree had issued in Kentucky with the husband having
moved to Georgia and the wife to Louisiana subsequent thereto. Id.
McCormick predates UIFSA by quite a number of years and clearly stated
that it had no statute addressing jurisdiction for the modification of child support
like it did for modification of child custody. The Kentucky Supreme Court used
the child custody statute as "instructive guidelines for determining this state's interest in assuming jurisdiction." McCormick, 623 S.W.2d at 910.
Ultimately the decision in McCormick parallels §611 of UIFSA. In finding
that "[bjoth states have significant contact with or interest in one or more of the
parties" the court held that "it does violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require that the appellant [husband] submit repeatedly to the jurisdiction of a Kentucky court for determination of an issue in which his state of
residency or domicile has a great interest.,..". McCormick, 623 S.W.2d at 910.
Under McCormick, Mrs. Case should have gone to Mr. Case's "state of residency
or domicile" to modify child support.
However, presently Utah does have its UIFSA, and Mrs. Case admits that
she never informed the court of that statute or its application to her case. Brief of
Appellee at 33. All counsel appearing before a tribunal are charged with informing
the court of authority which may be adverse to that counsel's position. Mrs. Case's
failure to inform the trial court of §78-45f-611 may very well be error, but it is for
this court to determine whether or not that error is harmless. Had she done so, this
appeal and all costs attendant thereto may well have been avoided.
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Point Two: Absent subject matter jurisdiction can the District court enter
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Mrs. Case cites numerous cases to support her proposition that summary
judgment was properly granted. Mr. Case will concede that those cases stand for
the proposition that absent some filings or pleadings responsive to a motion for
summary judgment that "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him." Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). All
cases cited by Mrs. Case include the words "if appropriate".
It is that "if appropriate" which Mr. Case brings forward. Under the facts of
this case where Mrs. Case, the petitioner below, specifically pleads a request that
the trial court communicate with California to determine whether or not Utah is the
proper forum for the modification. Record at 5. From the very beginning Mrs.
Case, her counsel, and the court are all on notice of a foreign order and jurisdictional issues. Id. (While the exact language of the petition addresses "venue", the
use of "venue" in the same sentence as communicating with the court of another
state the plain reading would indicate a question of jurisdiction; it is suggested that
Mrs. Case simply used the wrong word.) In that light, a summary judgment is inappropriate. The court and the parties were on notice of the need, and Mrs. Case's
request, for communications with a court of another state on the issue of modification of that other state's child support orders.
With that notice and the requirements of §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended), which requires notice and a hearing for factual determinations
of the three requirements set out in that statute, a grant of summary judgment could
not enter. Statute required factual determinations after a hearing, which did not occur.
Mrs. Case does argue for strict application of law under Rule 56, Utah Rules
15

of Civil Procedure. See pp. 33 - 37, Brief of Appellee.

Under the facts of the

case, the trial court was made aware by Mrs. Case of questionable subject matter
jurisdiction. "[Qjuestions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address
the merits of a particular case." Housing Authority of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT
28 at 5 11,44 P.3d 724,727 (Utah, 2002). "[Sjubject matter jurisdiction is an issue
that can and should be addressed sua sponte when jurisdiction is questionable."
Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151 (Utah 1995).
Furthermore, the defense of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore the strict application of law is that the trial court could not enter
summary judgment.

Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may not

enter summary judgment; for such an act is not appropriate. And where as in the
instant case, subject matter was questionable, it should have been addressed sua
sponte by the trial court.
Mrs. Case argues that her exclusive use of the UCCJEA as a jurisdictional
basis was not improper or error for reversal despite the fact that she agrees that
UIFSA controls. See Brief of Appellee at 31 - 36. Rule 3.3, Candor toward the
tribunal, Rules of Professional Conduct, requires disclosure of legal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or in this case the opposing party as Mr. Case was appearing pro se. Mrs. Case, while now admitting that
UIFSA controls did not raise that jurisdictional issue nor that statutory act. It can
be presumed that she and her counsel did research the issue and were, or should
have been, aware of §78-45f-611; yet she did not even raise it for the court's consideration.
16

Point Three: May the trial court in Utah modify a child support order without any showing of a substantial change in circumstances?
Mrs. Case admits, as a generality, that a showing of a substantial change in
circumstances is required before a court may modify a support order. Brief of Appellee at 38. She argues though, that when, as in the instant, child support is reserved until the occurrence of some condition precedent that this generality does
not apply. Id.
First, it is important to note exactly what the Superior Court, Stanislaus
County, California, ordered. The Judgment of Dissolution states "[tjhis judgment
contains provisions for child support or family support." {see Judgment of Disso*
lution, 5 4.h., Record at 7) and that "[e]hild support is ordered as set forth in the attached ... Marital settlement agreement, stipulation for judgment, or other written
order... Other (specify): See Attachment 4o.", {see Judgment of Dissolution, $ 4.1.
Record at 8). The pertinent part of Attachment 4.o, the provisions concerning child
support at 5 2, states:
"2. CHILD SUPPORT: The issue of child support shall be reserved until the first of the following events:
a.
The children attain the age of 18, and are not full-time
high school students residing with a parent or until the time the children
complete the 12th grade or attain the age of 19 years;
b.
The children die;
c.
The children enter into a valid marriage, are on active
duty with any of the armed forces of the United States of America or receive
a declaration of emancipation under California law;
d.
Further order of the court."
Recordatll-12.
Secondly, the Marital Settlement Agreement, referred to by Mrs. Case, see
Brief of Appellee at 40-42, was not incorporated into the California Judgment of
Dissolution as Mrs. Case asserts; nor was it entered in the record before the trial
court until after Mr. Case filed his Motion for Relief from Judgment. It was only
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entered before the trial court as an attachment to Mrs, Case's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment. Record at 82 - 111,
specifically 95-111. Therefore that agreement is not part of the Judgment of Dissolution nor was it before the Utah trial court at the time it made its initial grant of
summary judgment.
In support of her proposition that a showing of substantial change in circumstances is not required, Mrs. Case cites § 78-45-7.2(3), Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended). Section 78-45-7.2 is titled "Application of guidelines —
Rebuttable" and states, in part:
"[tjhe rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of
the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section."
Section 78-45-7.2(2)(b).
Section 78-45-7.2(3) states:
"[a] written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate,
or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut
the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through
findings, it is considered a deviated order."
The plain language of the statute shows only that the court may deviate from
the use of child support guidelines in ordering an award amount. It does not grant
the trial court the power to ignore the required showing of a substantial change in
circumstances in order to modify a child support order.
Mrs. Case next argues that her case is unique because the Judgment of Dissolution "reserved" the issue of child support until the occurrence of one of four
conditions precedent and that as the California court made no factual findings on
income, employment or related issues, there is nothing from which to show a sub-

is

stantiai change of circumstances. Brief of Appellee at 38-40. In support of that
assertion, she cites Ebel v. Brown, 246 N.W.2d 379 (Mich App. 1976).
Ebel is distinguishable on the facts and in law. Ebel involved a situation
where the child support was the "sum of $-none- per month..." and the mother
signed an affidavit releasing the father from "any and all support for the two minor
children." Ebel at 380. In addition, the Michigan court stated that, apparently as a
matter of law, "in wholly Michigan divorces, where a decree does not provide for
child support, maintenance may later be decreed regardless of whether a change in
circumstances has occurred." Ebel at 381 (citations omitted).
In the instant case child support was not set to "none" and Mrs. Case did not
release child support. Instead, she agreed to reserve it until the occurrence of one
of four events. And, in Utah, the Michigan doctrine cited in Ebel does not exist.
Ebel is inapplicable in Utah. This court has at various times "filled in the
blanks" when factual issues appear difficult. A case in point is Johansen v. Johansen, 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 22,2002 UT App 75,45 P.3d 520 (Utah App. 2002).
Johansen involved automatic reduction of child support in a situation where the
decree was entered prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 (Supp.
2001) (Automatic Adjustment Statute). Johansen, 45 P.3d at 521.

In resolution

of the problem, this court ordered that the trial court use the income of the parties
at the time of the decree and that the parties were to submit tax returns or related
documents if the income was not listed in the findings, order or worksheets. Johansen, 45 P.3d at 523 - 524. Such option is easily available in the instant case and
no special exception to the substantial change in circumstances needs to be created.
Mrs. Case further argues that the court should look to the intent of the parties
for guidance and input on changed circumstances, Brief of Appellee at p. 41; Mr.
Case agrees and that would be a very definite starting place for an evidentiary
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hearing consistent with Johansen This proposition of Mrs. Case in and of itself
contradicts her earlier argument, at p. 39 of her brief, that there is no starting point
from which to determine a change.
That starting point is available to the trial court. The California matter was
settled by stipulation. Each party presumably gave up something in consideration
for the final settlement; and that is exactly Mr. Case's point. He and Mrs. Case
agreed to reserve child support until the occurrence of some future event, the first
of the three enumerated events. Each presumably gave up somiething; and each of
these two parties were represented by counsel so they knowingly made that agreement. That settlement has value in and of itself and to now modify it requires the
same investigation as any other change in an order on child support in Utah.
Mrs. Case then again argues matters outside of the record; the marital settlement agreement. See Brief of Appellee, p. 41. As pointed out earlier in this
document, that agreement is not part of the Judgment of Dissolution. That document was not in the record prior to the judge's decision to grant summary judgment
and Mr. Case filing his Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Record at 82 - 111. It first
appeared in this matter in Mrs. Case's response to that motion to set aside. Record
at 95 - 111. As such, it was not a basis nor even available to the judge for his decision, though it may provide that starting point for an investigation of what the circumstances were and what changes occurred since that time at the trial level. Inquiries which should have been made, and additional argument for Mr. Case's
proposition that summary judgment without showing material changed circumstances is reversible error.
On this issue, should this court consider the marital stipulation, Mrs. Case
knew, with the advise of counsel, that at the time of the signing of that stipulation
that the child support to be set was below the mandatory minimum level. Mr. Case
20

would assert that reserving child support is certainly below the mandatory minimum level in California at the time of the signing of that document. As such,
which provision controls? Mr. Case asserts that this is a question for factual determinations and findings and as that provision was not included in the Judgment
of Dissolution, it is not part of the final judgment. Mrs. Case was represented by
counsel; it was her counsel that prepared those documents and the attachment to
the Judgment for Dissolution, see Record at 7 - 13; and, Mrs. Case should be
estopped from challenging such documentation.
As to Mrs. Case's final argument in this section, Mrs. Case goes into an
emotional appeal and, Mr. Case would say, personally denigrating argument. In
brief response, Mr. Case asserts that Mrs. Case knew what she was signing, that all
of her assertions contained therein are outside the record below, that he, Mr. Case,
gave up valuable rights in making that original settlement, and, upon information
and belief, Mrs. Case had been remarried the entire time pertinent to the instant
matter having remarried in March, 2003.
Point Four:

Attorney Fees:

Mrs. Case raises, as a separate point, the issue of attorney fees. She raises
§30-3-3. Utah Code Annot (1953, as amended) in support of her assertion that she
should be awarded her fees and costs. She is correct in citing that section as a basis
for an award of attorney fees and costs and §30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as
amended) and Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also may allow such an
award. But, she is incorrect in her assertions that Mr. Case's arguments are erroneous or frivolous. Brief of Appellee at 42. This court has already ruled on Mrs.
Case's assertions that the appeal is frivolous or otherwise improper in its order
denying Mrs. Case's Rule 10 Motion for Summary Disposition. See Order dated
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February 10,2004.
Mrs. Case may be entitled to such an award under statute, if this court so
finds such an award to be appropriate. However, Mr. Case has raised a very basic
point of jurisprudence in this appeal: Subject matter jurisdiction, which can be
raised at any time. See, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah, 1993)
(holding that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
and cannot be waived by the parties). See also, Utah Dep't of Bus. Reg., 602 P.2d
696, 699 (Utah, 1979) (holding that parties may not waive subject matter jurisdiction).
As the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, perhaps in part due
to Mrs. Case's failure to cite Utah's UIFSA 78-45M00 - 902, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), see Brief of Appellee,
p. 32 - 35 (wherein Mrs. Case admits she did not inform the trial court of this
statute and further, now agrees in her brief, that UIFSA is controlling), instead directing the court in a different direction, specifically Utah's UCCJEA, id, the trial
court could not act. Mr. Case is proper in his actions challenging that error and
suggests to this court that if either of the two parties should be awarded attorney
fees and costs, it is he as he is asserting a well settled matter of jurisprudence. For
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to determine a
controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Fishery. Fisher, 67 P.3d 1055,
1058 (Utah App. 2003).

Conclusion:
Despite all of the protestations, references, and citations set forth in Mrs.
Case's Brief of Appellee, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify a California Judgment of Dissolution of a marriage on the issue of child support
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as requested by Appellee in her Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree and
Modification of Decree filed in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
Sevier County, State of Utah, on March 24, 2003. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment entered by that district court in
favor of Appellee on September 10,2003, is void and needs to be set aside.
While Appellee cites numerous cases and secondary authority, the vast majority of such all were created before the drafting, adoption and implementation of
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, in Utah, §§ 78-45M00 - 902, Utah
Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
Appellee agrees with Appellant that Utah district court have general jurisdiction except as limited by the State's Constitution or statute. Utah Const. Art VIII.
Judicial Department, § 5. Appellee also agrees with Appellant that the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act is adopted in Utah is controlling. Brief of Appellee
at 33-35.
Part 6, Enforcement and modification of support order after registration, of
Title 78 Chapter 45F, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), deals specifically
with the facts of this case; a support order issued by a tribunal of another state
sought to be modified in this state. Section 78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. (1953,
as amended), enumerates three requirements that must be met before the Utah trial
court can modify that order and Appellee fails the second requirement; Appellee,
who seeks the modification, is not a "non-resident of this state....". Id.
As such, Utah's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is a statutory limitation on the general jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court "may modify that
order only if... after notice and hearing it finds that..." those three requirements
are met. 78-45f-611.

The trial court did not hold that hearing. The trial court

could not find that all three requirements are met. fhe trial court did not luue
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subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellee argues that because she obtained personal jurisdiction over Appellant, the trial court acquired subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established
though that the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court by
agreement or otherwise if the court does not have it. Therefore Appellee's arguments about personal jurisdiction do not apply.
Appellee also argues that the summary judgment was proper under rule because of Appellant's failure to respond. While arguing for strict legal enforcement
of Rule 56, she fails to address or appreciate the limitation set out in that rule; the
words "if appropriate". Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, which was first
brought into question by her own Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree
and Modification of Decree, where Appellee questioned whether the court below
was the correct court or not asking it to communicate with California, a grant of
summary judgment was not "appropriate".
Appellee further asserts that she does not need to show any substantial
change in circumstance to modify her California Judgment of Dissolution in Utah.
In support thereof she argues that her case is a special exception because there
were no initial findings, without any basis for that assertion in law, or that foreign
case law supports the lack of such a requirement. As shown above, that foreign
case law is inapplicable here due to differences in law and furthermore Utah has
ways and means of going back to the time of the initial order to reconstruct the
facts at that time for a determination of a substantial change in circumstance. Utah
holds to the requirement that the moving party shows that substantial change in order to proceed with a modification. Appellee needs to comply.
Those arguments are secondary to the fact that under 78-45f-611, Utah Code
Annot. (1953, as amended), the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction. As
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a result, the trial court cannot act and any judgment or ruling it made must be set
aside with the action to modify child support being dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this _ L day of May, 2004.

JDAVID
l R. HARTWIG, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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validity of the order or the administrative remedies is contested, the
agency must register the order under Article 6 and proceed in that
manner.159
[8] Enforcement and Modification of Child Support Orders
After Registration
While the registration.process set out in Article 6 appears to be
similar to RURESA §§ 35-40, there are several critical distinctions.
RURESA effectively encouraged multiple orders through de novo
proceedings. Under RURESA, there was also the ever-present worry
that, once registered, a responding state would modify the obligation
-generally downward to accommodate the resident obligor. This, too,
led to multiple orders. UIFSA precludes de novo orders except in very
limited circumstances,160 Registering for enforcement does not permit
modification of the registered order unless it is also registered for
modification and the conditions of the Act are met. 161
Under RURESA, upon registration the court entered a conforming
order of its own, leading to debate over whether modification of a
registered order had the res judicata effect of modifying the original
order.162 Registering under UIFSA authorizes the registering state to
enforce the issuing state order, not create one of its own. 163 The
issuing state retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over modification of the order.
159
The child support provisions of welfare reform all states will be required to
have more extensive administrative authority, including, bank levies, interstate
recognition of liens against an obligor's real and personal property, and even stronger
withholding provisions. See PRWORA and § 48.01 [2], supra.

1 6 0 A new order is presumably permitted when both parties have moved to the
same state, thus eliminating UIFSA's applicablity, and under § 207(b)(3) when
multiple orders exist but no state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
But see Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
161 See UIFSA §§ 603(c), 609 and 611(a)(1).
162 Compare Monson v. Monson, 271 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1978) (a modification
of the registered order may effect a modification in the rendering state) with WhiteNathan v. Nathan, 888 P.2d 237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (agreeing with other states'
interpretation of RURESA and holding that a support order entered by a responding
California court does not modify the original order established m the Anzona divorce
decree absent the responding court's express statement otherwise; thus, Arizona was
not required to grant full faith and credit to the California order).
163 Compare UIFSA § 603(b) with RURESA § 40(a), 9 U.L.A. at 546 (1987).
(Maiihcw Bender & Co, Inc)
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[a] Registration for Enforcement
Procedurally, registration of either an income-withholding order or
a support order is streamlined. The Act requires: a transmittal letter
requesting registration and enforcement; two copies, including one
certified copy, of all orders to be registered, including any modification
of an order; the petitioner's sworn statement or a certified statement
by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrears;
the name, social security number and address of the obligor; the name
and address of the obligor's employer; any source of income; description and location of any property subject to execution; and the name
and address of the obligee and to whom payments are to be sent.164
See Appendix 48C, infra, for UIFSA forms.
Upon receipt, the registering tribunal must "cause to be filed" the
order as a foreign judgment, regardless of the form.165 If a remedy
must be affirmatively sought under state law, a pleading must be filed
stating with specificity the grounds for the remedy sought. Otherwise,
no pleading is required.166
The order is registered when filed and is enforceable in the same
manner as an order of the registering state. 167 As noted above, when
registered for enforcement, the order may .not be modified.168
[b]

Choice of Law

The procedure and law of the registering state govern enforcement
issues, though do not affect the interpretation of the order being
enforced. For such matters as the nature, extent, amount and duration
of the support obligation and the payment of arrearages under the
order, the law of the issuing state controls.169 For instance, UIFSA
provides that the duration of the obligor's duty is governed by the
law with original issuing jurisdiction. This is consistent with case
law 1 7 0 Although the rules are straightforward, counsel should
16

* UIFSA § 602(a).
5 UIFSA § 602(b).
166
UIFSA § 602(c).
16
7 UIFSA §§ 603(a) and (b).
is* UIFSA § 603(c).
16
9 UIFSA § 604(a).
170 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 122 Cal. App. 3d 209, 175 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1981)
(Missouri's order was entitled to full faith and credit; as such, support was due until
16
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anticipate some thorny choice-of-law questions arise while sorting
through existing multiple orders in order to determine the controlling
order and which jurisdiction has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
Regarding the applicable limitations period, UIFSA directs the
registering state to apply the statute of limitations of the issuing state,
if it is longer. m This appears to be an exception based on a public
policy choice in favor of enforcing child support debts.
[c]

Contest to Registration

When either a support order or income-withholding order is registered, the registering tribunal must notify the non-registering party.
The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order
and supporting documents. The notice must recite: the effect of
registration (i.e., that it is enforceable as of the date of registration
in the same manner as an order of the registering state); the amount
of arrears alleged; that failure to file a timely contest will result in
confirmation not only of the order but also of the alleged arrears, and
that future contest is precluded; and that a hearing to contest must
be requested within 20 days after notice.172
Although not required, it may be advisable to notify the respondent
that the order being registered is the one the petitioner (whether the
obligor or the obligee) alleges is controlling for prospective
enforcement.
Finally, when registering an income withholding order, the registering tribunal must notify the obligor's employer in the same manner
as set out in the state's income withholding law. 173
If no contest is filed, the registered order is confirmed by operation
of law 174 and any further contest is precluded, including a challenge
the child reached the age of majority in Missouri, even though the order was registered
in California, where the support obligation had ended three years earlier); GonzalezGoengaga v. Gonzaleg, 426 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
i 7 * UIFSA § 604(b).
i 7 ^ UIFSA § 605(b). See Mathis v. State, 930 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) (a certified
copy of a judgement bearing an attestation that the document is a true copy, satisifies
the authentication requirements of the rules of evidence).
* 7 3 UIFSA § 605(c).
I 7 * UIFSA § 606(b).
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc )
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to the amount of arrears. 175 This election represents a significant
policy shift from RURESA.176
Within the allotted time frame, the non-registering party may "seek
to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of
noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies
being sought or the amount of any alleged arrears."177 If a timely
contest is filed, the registering tribunal must schedule a hearing and
give notice* of the hearing to the parties.178
The contesting party has the burden of proving one of the limited
defenses available under the Act.179 These are: the issuing tribunal
lacked personal jurisdiction; the order was obtained by fraud; the order
has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later order; the issuing
tribunal stayed the order pending appeal; satisfaction occurred in full
or in part; there is a defense under the registering state's law to the
specific remedy sought; the application of the statute of limitations
precludes enforcement of some or all arrears.
Counsel is likely to encounter litigants who believed a de novo
RURESA order acted as a, modification of the original order for which
175

UIFSA § 608.
^6 See, e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 205 Cal. App. 3d 253, 252 Cal. Rptr. 359
(1988) (cited in the official comments to § 608) (the obligor was not precluded from
challenging the arrears amount alleged under the registered order; the court held that
the 20-day period set out in the registration statute and the notice applied only to
petitions contesting the confirmation of the registered order).
177
UIFSA § 606(a).
17
3 UIFSA § 606(c).
179
UIFSA § 607(a). See, e.g. Villanueva v. Office of the Attorney General, 935
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Father contested a registration of an Indiana support
order asserting, among other things, that the Indiana orders were "too ambiguous,
indefinite and uncertain" and that he could not comply with the term requiring him
to pay by military allotment as he was no longer in military service. He further claimed
that the trial court erred in failing to order paternity testing before entering the
arrearage judgment. The appellate court held that under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the introduction of a facially valid foreign order
creates a prima facie case for its recognition and enforcement. It can only be attacked
on limited grounds; the burden of proof is on the party challenging the order. Neither
non-paternity nor the fact that the underlying order is not enforceable by contempt
is a defense to the validity or enforcement of a support order registered under UIFSA;
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 1996 Va. App. Lexis 261 (permiting registration and
enforcement of a North Carolina spousal support order in Virginia accompanied by
a complaint for specific performance against the Virginia resident obligor).
(Matthew Bender & Co . inc.)
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registration and enforcement are sought. Yet it is unlikely the de novo
aspect of RURESA was understood. Counsel is forewarned that an
obligor who thought the order had been lowered and is now told that
retroactive modification is precluded will be frustrated and angry.180
If the obligor presents evidence of a full or partial defense, the
tribunal may stay enforcement, continue the proceedings to permit
production of additional relevant evidence, or enforce any uncontested
portions of the registered order during a stay or continuance.1S1 If the
contestant fails to establish a defense, the tribunal must issue an order
confirming the registration.132
[d] Registration and Modification
Once the election was made to replace the de novo proceedings
operating under RURESA with a "one order, one time, one place"
approach to interstate litigation, drafting complexity was exponentially
increased and the door was opened to complaints about policy choices.
As stated earlier, UIFSA incorporates the concept of continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction,1S3 under which only one state is granted the
right to modify the existing support order. Part 3 of UEFSA Article
6 governs. The concept is straightforward: so long as either of the
individual parties or the child resides in the state that entered the
original order, that state retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify its
order, upon proper petition.184 In such circumstances, even" though
a sister state's order has been registered for enforcement, the registering state is precluded from modifying it. See § 48.03[8][a], supra.
Where the individual parties and the child have left the issuing state,185
or if the individual parties agree in writing to take the case to another
180 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9), requiring adoption of state laws in conformity with
the so-called Bradley amendment, requiring full faith and credit with respect to child
support arrears and precluding retroactive modification of support orders prior to filing
and notice of a petition for modification.
i s i UIFSA § 607(b).
182 UIFSA § 607(c).
i 8 3 Actually, two concepts are involved, not one: jurisdiction is both continuing
and exclusive. This is a good mantra to keep in mind as one sorts through UIFSA.
184 UIFSA § 611 (a) is the counterpart to § 205(b), which describes the attending
circumstances when a state's continuing jurisdiction lapses.
185 UIFSA § 611(a)(l)(i).
(Maiihcw Bender &. Co . Inc.)
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state, 186 UIFSA sets out a methodology for registering the support
order in another state for purposes of modification.137 While either
the obligor or obligee may seek a modification of the order, modification must be sought in the jurisdiction of the opposing party. 188
The policy choice to require the petitioner in a modification action
to be a non-resident of the forum state is intended in part to avoid
"hometowning," common under RURESA and considered to be a chief
reason for the decrease in the number of orders in interstate matters.
UIFSA § 611(a), which applies to both obligors and obligees, provides
a rough parity by placing the burden to litigate in a distant forum on
the party who wishes to change a perfectly valid, enforceable order.
For those attorneys, advocates and policy makers who prefer a
"home state" rule for jurisdiction in child support cases, the nonresident requirement of § 611(a) is unduly restrictive. They argue that
when the nexus between the issuing state and the individual litigants
and child is severed, a party seeking modification should be able to
use UIFSA7 s long-arm provisions (contained in § 201) to obtain
jurisdiction over a non-resident, rather than being forced to litigate
in the opposing party's forum.189 Still, it is undeniable that UIFS A's
non-residency requirement avoids the potential of a second round of
186

UIFSA § 611(b). If both parties agree to transfer jurisdiction, one has made
a mistake. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (with Unofficial Annotations
by John J. Sampson), 27 Fam. L.Q. 1, 162, n. 157 (ABA Spring 1993).
iS7 UIFSA § 610.
iss UIFSA § 611(a). UIFSA (1996) makes a two exceptions to this rule. First, if
the issuing tribunal is a foreign jurisdiction which has not enacted laws or procedures
substantially similar to UIFSA, consent otherwise reguired of the local resident is
not required.UIFSA § 611 (a)(2). Second, and far more importantly, the drafters added
§ 613, designed to permit registration for modification of a support order from a state
lacking CEJ, into a state where both the individual parties reside. There is no
corresponding requirement that the child reside in the forum state (although the child
must have left the issuing state for CEJ to have lapsed). Because modification of an
order in such circumstances is an intrastate matter, little off UHFSA applies—only
Articles 1, 2 and 6.
189
The original Senate and House versions of welfare reform (H.R. 4) contained
language that attempted to change this key UIFSA provision by mandating that states
adopt alternate language when enacting UIFSA as a condition to receiving IV-D
federal funds. Upon being advised of numerous concerns about this change, including
objections to both the policy change and the language drafted, the conference bill
deleted the change. See Federal Register, Nov. 15, 1995; Balanced Budget Act of
1995, § 12321.
(Matthew Bender & Co , lnc)
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challenges to a support order occasioned by the use of long-arm
jurisdictional provisions.
Litigation should not prove unduly burdensome to the out-of-state
party in light of UIFSA's evidentiary provisions.190 A party seeking
modification is, however, subjected to the procedural and substantive
laws of the opponent's state.191 Thus, an obligor who seeks to modify
an existing support order when both parties and the child have left
the issuing state must register the existing order for modification in
the state with personal jurisdiction over the obligee. The registering
state then will apply its own child support guidelines to the recalculations of the obligation and its own rules of modification, irrespective
of the standard used to set the original order. The responding state
cannot modify any provision of the order not subject to modification
in the issuing state. Nor can it modify the duration of the support
obligation.
Under § 611(c), a tribunal cannot modify any aspect of a child
support order that cannot be modified under the law of the issuing
state. For example, if child support was ordered through age 21 in
accordance with the law of the issuing state and the law of the forum
state ends the support obligation at age 18, modification by the forum
tribunal may not affect the duration fo the support order to age 2 1 1 9 2
The process of registration for modification is similar to that for
enforcement. See § 48.03 [8][a], supra. The petition for modification
may be filed simultaneously with an enforcement registration or
sometime thereafter, if the qualifying conditions are met. The pleading
must specify the grounds for modification.193 The party obtaining the
modification must, within 30 days unless the state selects another time
frame, file a certified copy of the modified order with the issuing
tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction arid in each tribunal
190UIFSA §§ 316, 317 and 318.
191UIFSA § 610
192 i n Mario v. Lune, 1995 WL 131907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), the appellant-mother
sought enforcement and modification of a New York child support order in California
under URESA. In New York, the support obligation ends when a child reaches age
21; in California, support ceases at age 18. The California court held that it could
modify the order upward only until the child reached California's age of majority;
thereafter, it could only enforce the New York order; any modification after the age
of majority would take place in New York.
193 UIFSA § 609.
(Maiihcw Bender & Co , Inc )
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